Abstract. We propose a new encryption primitive called Membership Encryption. Let P(G) be a privacy-preserving token on a group attribute/identity G, such that given P(G) it is hard to know the attributes in G. In this membership encryption, if an encryption takes as input an attribute A and the token P(G), the decryption requires holding the membership A ∈ G, i.e., A belongs to this group attribute. Membership encryption is applicable in constructing membership proof A ∈ P(G) with privacy preserving on group attribute and the membership. Membership encryption can be also utilized to construct an efficient two-round K-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol. In this paper, we construct a provably secure membership encryption where the group token P(G) is constant-size with maximum number accountability on attributes. Using our scheme, the proposed oblivious transfer protocol exhibits the nice feature of O(1) communication cost for any K from receiver to sender, and O(N ) communication cost from sender to receiver.
Introduction
Membership Proof. Proving that an attribute A belongs to a group attribute G, denoted by group membership A ∈ G, is useful and non-trivial especially when privacy protections are essential. Let P(O) denote privacy protection (e.g. commitment) on the object O, such that given P(O) it is hard to know the object O. The privacy-preserving membership proof falls into two different cases:
The verifier knows the token P(A) and all attributes in G. The prover wants to prove that the attribute in P(A) belongs to G without leaking the real attribute A to the verifier. Assuming that each attribute is an individual, this membership proof is towards privacy protection on the involved individual. We found the technique called set membership proof [11, 8, 6 ] is proposed for P(A) ∈ G.
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-A ∈ P(G). The verifier knows the attribute A and the token P(G). The prover wants to prove that the group attribute in P(G) contains A without leaking other attributes in G to the verifier. This membership proof is aiming at protecting the privacy of non-involved individuals. We found the technique called accumulator with witness [3, 2, 17, 14, 7, 1] can be seen as a membership proof for A ∈ P(G).
Membership proof is useful in those privacy-preserving applications (see [11, 8, 6, 3, 2, 17, 14, 7 ,1]), where P(O) instead of O is certified for privacy purpose, and the prover wants to prove that the certified P(O) satisfies some membership.
Motivation. In this work, we extend the membership by proof to membership by encryption. We are interested in exploring the notion of membership encryption. Let G = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A k } be a finite set of group attribute, and P(G) denote the privacy-preserving group G. Following the membership proof A ∈ P(G), the membership encryption A ∈ P(G) is defined as follows: when the encryption takes as input A and P(G), the decryption requires holding the membership A ∈ G. We focus on the membership encryption A ∈ P(G) only as it can be naturally transferred into the membership encryption P(A) ∈ G, when P(·) contains only one attribute. For example, let G = {A 1 , A 2 }. To generate a membership encryption P(A) ∈ {A 1 , A 2 }, we run membership encryption A 1 ∈ P(A) and A 2 ∈ P(A) on the same message and R, where R = {r 1 , r 2 } and r i is the randomness for A i ∈ P(A) encryption. It is not hard to verify that this is equivalent to the membership encryption P(A) ∈ G.
Encryption vs Proof.
Membership encryption is more powerful compared to membership proof in terms of three reasons. Firstly, a membership proof A ∈ P(G) cannot be converted into a membership encryption, but a successful decryption of membership encryption with A and P(G) as input naturally implies the membership A ∈ P(G). Secondly, given a membership proof, the verifier might be able to compromise the privacy of P(G) to others by publishing the membership proof A ∈ P(G). While the membership proof from membership encryption is non-transferable. Finally, considering the scenario that Alice would send a message to Bob if he can prove the membership A ∈ P(G). Using the membership proof, Bob needs to generate the proof first and then Alice sends messages to Bob after checking the proof, which costs two separated steps. Membership encryption combines the two steps into one, which improves the communication efficiency.
Membership encryption is also useful in other applications. One of them is the oblivious transfer protocol [19] . Suppose there are N messages M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M N , and a receiver wants to get part of them without leaking her/his choice to the message owner (sender). Using the membership encryption, the receiver generates P(C) and sends it to sender, where C ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N} is the receiver's choice. The sender then encrypts message M i with the index i and P(C). If i ∈ C, the receiver can decrypt the message M i ; otherwise i / ∈ C, the receiver will not be able to extract M i . Suppose the number of choices is accountable
